I accept that trying to understand persons as objects is difficult and integral to our experience over time but balk at the idea that such a development can be reduced to a single habit that can be stopped like smoking or swinging arms after certain verbal outbursts.

The quote doesn't say this specifically, but I interpret the Soul (ousia, essence, form -- subject?, person?) as Transcendent & Potential, and Body (matter, flesh, substance) as Immanent & Actual. — Gnomon

Your depiction of Actual and Potential reverses their roles given in Aristotle's writing:

For this reason those are right in their view who maintain that the soul cannot exist without the body, but is not itself in any sense a body. It is not a body, it is associated with a body, and therefore resides in a body, and in a body of a particular kind; not at all as our predecessors supposed, who fitted it to any body, without adding any limitations as to what body or what kind of body, although it is unknown for any chance thing to admit any other chance thing. But our view explains the facts quite reasonably for the actuality of each thing is naturally inherent in its potentiality, that is in its own proper matter. From all this it is clear that the soul is a kind of actuality or notion of that which has the capacity of having a soul. — ibid. 414a

The key thing here is that matter is not an utter lack of actuality but reflects an architecture of integration. If we investigate with that model in hand, we can start thinking about nature (physis or what comes-to-be.

When talking about the intellect as possibly eternal, De Anima does not present that in the way it is discussed as a personal survival of death in Plato (a topic for another day). For Aristotle, the actuality of life includes all forms and their functions must include all the simpler types even if the more advanced kinds do things the others cannot. Later Platonists, especially Plotinus, disliked this tension and argued against Aristotle in some places and remodeled his model in others. What you call a "hylomorph" has a job in Plotinus.

Whoever you think more correct, the distinction between transcendental versus immanent is a confusing attribution amongst these ideas. With the different accounts of creation, the consequences were what they were. In Plato's Statesman, there is an interesting account of the Maker reversing time to reboot the system but that is quite different from imagining a power above nature that acts willy nilly and directly interferes with the affairs of men. Spinoza said that all that sort thing was the projection of our limitations upon the Creator.

Best of the season for you and the dear other.

Yes, there has been a sharp falling off of attempts to defend his behavior as a political device.

Experiencing, understanding and reasoning are acts of subjectivity. They are not something over and above the subject but constitutive of the subject itself. So when I engage in these activities I am intrinsically conscious of them as constitutive of me. Or so I would argue... — Esse Quam Videri

Kant made an effort to address this in the Paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason. Perhaps you could set your thesis against that since his view is sharply different from yours.

I am reluctant to directly compare this to Descartes as he published in such a constrained environment.

I am also reluctant to make my quoted passage a generality when I put it forward to show an example of his analysis and manner of discourse rather than put the passage on par with the problems he presented in his Metaphysics.

I take the 'soul as the form of the body' to mean the soul (psuche) is the principle of the body. — Wayfarer

The rest of that sentence is important: "the form of a body which has life potentially. The next statement touches on the sense you are referring to: "Substance is actuality" (ἡ δ᾿ οὐσία ἐντελέχειa).

The use of form (εἶδος) is within the larger context of agency. Consider this discussion of "contraries:

But, since only such things as possess contrariety or are themselves actual contraries—and not any chance things—are naturally adapted to be acted upon and to act, both “agent” and “patient” must be alike and identical in kind, but unlike and contrary in species. For body is by nature adapted so as to be affected by body, flavour by flavour, colour by colour, and in general that which is of the same kind by something else of the same kind; and the reason of this is that contraries are always within the same kind, and it is contraries which act and are acted upon reciprocally. Hence “agent” and “patient” are necessarily in one sense the same, and in another sense “other” and unlike one another; and since “agent” and “patient” are identical in kind and like, but unlike in species, and it is contraries which have these characteristics, it is clear that contraries and their “intermediates” are capable of being affected and of acting reciprocally—indeed it is entirely these processes which constitute passing-away and coming-to-be. — Aristotle, On Coming to Be and Passing Away, 323b, Forster and Furley

In the above passage, "species" is the translation of εἶδος and "kind" translates γένος.

For Aristotle forms exist in substances. Their existence is, in some sense, constitutive of substance. This is what I meant when I said he considered form to be immanent to material substances. For him form is literally inseparable from matter. When form enters the mind it is still bound to the matter of the organism, but in a different mode of existence. In that case the form exists in a way that determines “what” the organism is thinking about or perceiving, rather than in a way that determines “what” the organism is. — Esse Quam Videri

By this formulation, you reserve a separate "place" for "forms" that Aristotle resisted. In either yours or 's account, the meaning of the words "matter" and "form" are given through the activity of the soul. I have been chided for quoting too much Kant recently so I will go back to my previous habit of quoting too much Aristotle:

412a6. Now we speak of on particular kind of existent things as substance (οὐσία), and under this heading we so speak of one thing qua matter, which in itself is not a particular thing, another qua shape and form, in virtue of which it is then spoken of as a particular, and a third qua the product of these two. And matter is potentiality, while form is actuality---and that in two ways, first as knowledge is, and second as contemplation is. — Aristotle, De Anima, 412a6, translated by D.W. Hamlyn

This is different from the role of 'material' depicted in Plato or the expressions of 'mind-independence' in modern writings. So far, we are not too far away from Kant. For some unknown reason, we know stuff. This is different from asking why we know stuff. Making the first condition a mystery is not an advance.

The distance from Plato is a different job, some of it done on this site. I won't try that here. Back to the next paragraph in De Anima:

412a11, It is bodies especially which are thought to be substances, and of these, especially natural bodies; for these are sources of the rest. Of natural bodies, some have life and some do not; and it is self-nourishment, growth, and decay that we speak of as life. Hence, every natural body which partakes of life will be a substance, and substance of a composite kind. — ibid. 412a11

At this point, it is tempting to say that this composite is a jazz fusion of 'form' and 'matter.' But the equation of matter and potential in the first paragraph throws all of this into a different light. It is not an issue of inclusion or exclusion from the "intellect." The "ways we talk about it" are not the last words about what it is. We need all three ways because they are not replacements of the others.

The passage is no starting point for the distinction between immanence and transcendence in the theological sense because nothing is possible if it is not "natural." Aristotle questions the freedom of the "Craftsman" in the Timaeus. A topic that leads to the third paragraph:

412a16. Since it is indeed a body of such a kind (for it is one having life), the soul will not be body; for the body is not something predicated of a subject, but exists rather as subject and matter. The soul must then, be substance qua form of a natural body which has life potentially. Substance is actuality. The soul, therefore, will be the actuality of a body of this kind. — ibid. 412a16

I won't quote the fourth paragraph but will respond if any of you do.

Trump's reaction to Reiner's death reflects a life inside a recently shaken snow globe.

Are you speaking strictly for yourself or intending to represent what Kant meant by these terms?

I do not have your confidence regarding historical necessity.

For that reason, I don't want to suggest I am arguing against your thesis.

I take your point about originality. I am not an apologist, in the many ways that may be understood.

Kierkegaard makes an interesting attempt at looking at innocence from a personal point of view. It is an instance where the report may be wrong. Explanation needs to be tested against experience.

I think that expresses an aspect of it.

But perceiving what comes from actions is another thing. Conflicts of motivation.

Hmmmn, any redemptive features after that list of bad things...?

Does that call for a justification to match a condemnation? There is an abundance of that sort of thing about. We are not in a great place to set up scales of that sort.

I figure the idea of a personal conscience is worthy, however much or little it came about because of the history of Christianity.

I have read and heard of deontology as the contrary to consequentialism. In those terms, I suppose Kant is more of the former than the latter. He definitely does not subscribe to an ethics of outcomes. On the other hand, Kant does see how an increase of human freedom would make a less terrible world.

But by that measure, Aristotle also holds that virtues are a natural telos for a human. Whatever the design of nature makes that the case does not change the context of an individual "doing those things for their own sake."

I brought in the Critique of Judgment quote to emphasize how the years of "Christian" discourse has put a focus on the "person" not expressed the same way in Aristotle.

I would argue that most Western ethics (secular and identity politics) seem to be derived from Christian values (and I guess classical Greek), though I know some people might consider this anathema. But how could it not be the case after a couple of millennia? — Tom Storm

For Kant, the matter is not a derivation from Christian values but a focus on the concerns of the individual reflecting upon their condition as individuals. The source of the recognition of duty as imperative is said to come from reason itself but the expectation for an individual is a problem of hope and belief. Consider this account of the difference between Kant and Spinoza:

Suppose, then, that a person, partly because all the highly praised speculative arguments [for the existence of God] are so weak, and partly because he finds many irregularities both in nature and in the world of morals. became persuaded of the proposition: There is no God. Still, if because of this he regarded the laws of duty as merely imaginary, invalid, nonobligatory, and decided to violate them boldly, he would in his own eyes be a worthless human being. Indeed, even if such a person could later overcome his initial doubts and convince himself that there is a God after all, still with his way of thinking he would forever remain a worthless human being. For while he might fulfill his duty ever so punctiliously as far as effects are concerned. he would be doing so from fear, or for reward, rather than with an attitude of reverence for duty. Conversely, if he believed [in the existence of God J and complied with his duty sincerely and unselfishly according to his conscience, and yet immediately considered himself free from all moral obligation every time he experimentally posited that he might some day become convinced that there is no God, his inner moral attitude would indeed have to be in bad shape.

Therefore, let us consider the case of a righteous man (Spinoza, for example) who actively reveres the moral law [but] who remains firmly persuaded that there is no God and (since, as far as [achieving] the
object of morality is concerned, the consequence is the same) that there is also no future life: How will he judge his own inner destination to a purpose, [imposed] by the moral law? He does not require that complying with that law should bring him an advantage, either in this world or in another; rather, he is unselfish and wants only to bring about the good to which that sacred law directs all his forces. Yet his effort [encounters] limits: For while he can expect that nature will now and then cooperate contingently with the purpose of his that he feels so obligated and impelled to achieve, he can never expect nature to harmonize with it in a way governed by laws and permanent rules (such as his inner maxims are and must be). Deceit, violence, and envy will always be rife around him, even though he himself is honest, peaceable, and benevolent. Moreover, as concerns the other righteous people he meets: no matter how worthy of happiness they may be, nature, which pays no attention to that, will still subject them to all the evils of deprivation, disease, and untimely death, just like all the other animals on the earth. And they will stay subjected to these evils always, until one vast tomb engulfs them one and all (honest or not, that makes no difference here) and hurls them, who managed to believe they were the final purpose of creation, back into the abyss of the purposeless chaos of matter from which they were taken. And so this well-meaning person would indeed have to give up as impossible the purpose that the moral laws obligated him to have before his eyes, and that in compliance with them he did have before his eyes. Alternatively, suppose that, regarding this [purpose I too, he wants to continue to adhere to the call of his inner moral vocation, and that he does not want his respect for the moral law, by which this law directly inspires him to obey it, to be weakened, as would result from the nullity of the one ideal final purpose that is adequate to this respect's high demand (such weakening of his respect would inevitably impair his moral attitude): In that case he must-from a practical point of view, i.e., so that he can at least form a concept of the possibility of [achieving] the final purpose that is morally prescribed to him-assume
the existence of a moral author of the world, i.e., the existence of a God; and he can indeed make this assumption, since it is at least not intrinsically contradictory. — Kant, Critique of Judgement, page 451

One big difference between this and Aristotle is the focus on the inhospitality of nature concerning the life of a person. Is that Camus in the background, firing up a Gauloises?

I am glad to see your rethink because I think it is important to not turn all of this into one goo.

In terms of the next generation, it is a large difference between encouraging a revolt versus some kind of accommodation. That involves the different agendas underway at the time but also how one is to live in the future. What we accept or reject personally involves who we care for, however we choose to understand that.

Orban hyperventilates. Maybe the band can get back together.

One aspect about the difference between Hobbes and Rousseau is how their language appears in different political messaging. There is a "this arbitrary power is better than its absence" set against "there is a better way to proceed that does not require so much power."

Imagining what would happen without X does not seem to be the singular province of anyone.

I see that you have posted your thread and will follow with interest.

In the context of political divisions brought up in this thread, the lack of moral realism is being depicted by Leontiskos as the source for one side of a divide. To put it that way makes the topic political in its own right.

In the formulations of what is "natural" for humans, the debate over kinds of authority has been the central problem. For instance, is Hobbes right that only a central authority can stop the natural war between men or is Rousseau correct that we have come from a different way of life that did not require that much power?

The difference between them is not whether morality is real or not.

Verveake has come up a lot in discussions here. I suggest searching the site regarding Plotinus to get a sense of the disputes underway and what different people make of them, specifically as the issues concern Aristotle.

I am not working that hard so will only hope you get what you are striving toward.

In the more traditional Aristotelian formulation, matter was construed not as res extensa, nor as a bare substrate, but rather as the principle of individuation and potentiality in the world. In this view, a material object is not mere matter (which cannot not exist on its own), but a compound of matter and form. The mind gains knowledge of material objects via the processes of perception and understanding (intentional acts), through which it comes to grasp the very same forms inherent in the material object itself. — Esse Quam Videri

Before the idea came into collision with modern philosophy, there is the view of Plotinus who presented 'matter' as a field penetrated by form but never completely occupied by it. All the ways to understand an "individual" had to be looked for on the side of the intellectual soul.

That does not sum up all that the 'scholastics' said but does reflect Augustine's preference for Plotinus over Plato.

Okay, I will give it a go.

From my experience, the views of 'moral realism' you brought up do not reflect how education works in families and institutions. How sharply one differentiates those from each other is a source of conflict in communities and political structures. Sometimes that adds up to one policy being advanced over another. Other times, that is an underlying feature of life in a particular place that does not get formulated in that way. From that perspective, I don't view any theory of connecting or disconnecting those aspects as important as people looking for what benefits or harms the chances of their hopes and fears.

Consider the habit of adversarial discourse in families. I was raised in one of those as was my son. I have known and worked with people who did not. That difference is a genuine cultural divide that is not simply a product of different opinions. On the other hand, it is obvious that it does influence opinion. What we all choose to do in such divergences is a personal matter of choice that theory cannot relieve us from. Tolerance is easy until it is in your face.

Seeing the aggregating function of the algorithm in action, it prompts me to wonder on the life expectancy of the inside joke or "esoteric" reference in writing. A sort of an inverse to the "Newspeak" problem because now, too much is included.

Are you asking me to explain what I said without reference to what I just said?

If the context I put forward is not germane to the discussion, it is difficult for me to imagine what is.

Will ponder. I do not have a snappy response.

I figure education is captured by an ongoing cultural war. From that point of view, any program put forward is not only a policy proposal but an attempt to vanquish some other view.

Noticing that development is not the same as understanding it.

It is not enough to note that some people seek their advantage.

I figure we were on the same page about that for some time regardless of whatever else we disagreed upon.

My comment was not to challenge your argument but to put it into the context of many others.

I was not claiming Kant as my north star, only pointing to a breaking point in a reference to him.

Well, Kant was pretty confident he was up to speed about the correct rules. I can take your point without agreeing there is no tension here.

As a matter of philosophical tradition, the problem of comparing the subjective to the objective is not being able to stand outside the circumstances in order to provide comparisons.

That you have freely given yourself this power is no reflection upon those who did not.

I have had a different experience.

My family fought on both sides of our Civil War in the U.S. The choices between what is acceptable or not is worked out each day wherever we are. Education of children is critical to what happens next.

I don't see how your disagreements with people bear upon the matter.

I am willing to address that but how does that relate to your view of the presence of

assertions that morality doesn't really exist. — Leontiskos

I take your point about Kant putting forth a vision of universal humanism but that also came with a view of the law that was in conformity with authority that you might not like. He praised Hobbes speaking on the need for lawful authority. There is a hazard when projecting present political divisions into the past.

That read doesn't seem to align with right/left categories. — Leontiskos

I agree. Crisp is pointing to a process of accommodation where the source of annoyance for whoever tends to recede into the background of other annoying things.

So we get a vacillation between moralizing and assertions that morality doesn't really exist. — Leontiskos

I was trying to draw a broad sharp line between those who support institutions even if they often suck and those who want to shake the Etch a Sketch upside down. I am not aware of any of the former kind who subscribe to the purely emotional view you propose to be a significant factor in political discourse.

Pardon me if my last response was rude.

Rather than proclaim what is happening in my country, I will put forward a question. What Crisp is saying does reflect what is is happening here but is actively being opposed by efforts that want to have power over the next generation. Thus, all the very real dismantling of institutions that preserve the present status quo.

Is there a similar struggle going on in the Down Under?

Tolerance is a terrible word. To be 'tolerated' sounds judgemental. — Tom Storm

It is judgmental. A society accepts slavery and then stops doing that.

That is a different cultural war from curtailing expressions of personal identity.